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be. But it has changed for the worse in some ways. In
1963, in the Fall — this was after the March in Washing-
ton—public opinion polls showed that more than 75 per-
cent of the American people wanted strong, new civil
rights legislation with teeth in it and wanted to see it en-
forced. This was white, black, north, south, east, west.
They were on our side; we couldn't lose. We had to win; we
had won already because we had swung public opinion to
our side.
But public opinion changed. The back-lash began de-
veloping in the middle '60's. Oh, people were frightened
by Black Power, talk of revolution, by publicity of inner-
city crime, muggings, rapes and murders. They were
frightened by political capital made of the busing issue
and of the welfare chiselers issue; they were frightened by
the summer riots and the riots in the wake of Dr. King's
assassination. Those of lower middle classes were fright-
ened because there was job training for unskilled blacks
and Hispanics and Native Americans with modern tech-
niques and modern equipment, and they feared they were
being trained for their jobs and they thought their jobs
would be in jeopardy and the gains which they had made,
they thought might be lost. Those who have one foot up
the ladder are terrified when there is motion from below
them. So it changed. By the middle '70's, public opinion
polls showed that the majority of the American people
felt, first, that there was no longer any systemic racial dis-
crimination except in reverse, and second, that blacks had
moved too far too fast, had gotten too much too fast. In
the '60's we were victims and popular. Nobody would
have dared have a cocktail party without having at least
one of us there. We were a very popular people then. But
in the '70's and into the '80's, we were viewed more as vic-
timizes, not as victims. We were victims before, victims
of oppression — long suffering, now victimizers. We have
to change that around. We are going to need the alliance,
the friendship, the coalition, the help of all of those of
goodwill. If I may close with the words of Hillel, a Rabbi
of 2,000 years ago: "If I am not for myself, who will be for
me? If I am for myself alone what am I? And if not now,
when?"
From a speech by Mr. Farmer at the University of Massachu-
setts at Boston on March 5, 1986, in the William Monroe Trotter
Institute Distinguished Lecture Series on affirmative action.
The Economic Status
of Blacks
in Boston
by
James E. Blackwell
In recent years, special attention has been given to
problems of racism in Boston. Without question, highly
publicized steps have been taken by civic, business, reli-
gious, and neighborhood groups to combat racism, big-
otry and discrimination. Frequently, these initiatives have
also been supported by municipal and state governments
or administrations. Strategies for improving the racial cli-
mate in Boston, initiated by the Covenant for Racial Jus-
tice, the Boston Committee, the Coalition for a Better
Boston, and now, the newly created PARTNERSHIP, as
well as some pronouncements of the (Mayor) Flynn and
(Governor) Dukakis administrations must be applauded.
However, despite such courses of actions, there is con-
vincing evidence to support the contention that the roots
of racial and ethnic discrimination have not been fully ad-
dressed. Further, there exists a telling discontinuity be-
tween rhetoric and demonstrated success in alleviating
the basic problems of racial discord and race-based exclu-
sion from the social and economic infrastructure of the
Boston community.
In the monograph, The Emerging Black Community of
Boston, 1 I focused on structural barriers and conditions
which either accelerate or impede access and upward mo-
bility of blacks in the occupational structure. This work
offered a description of the general economic conditions
and status of blacks in Boston at mid-1985. The theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the paper were sociological, social-
psychological and economic interpretations of prejudice
and discrimination in the marketplace. Trend data on the
character of that discrimination, the underrepresentation
of blacks in public and private sector employment,
poverty, unemployment, and income — all were obtained
from a variety of sources. The trend data covered a period
from 1979 to mid-1985. Since the publication of this doc-
ument, I have examined additional data, some of which
were generated by the Flynn Administration.
My conclusions remain unchanged! Despite the enor-
mous economic boom currently experienced by the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts and the City of Boston, and
despite some improvements in their status, blacks and
other minorities have not shared equally and fully in this
recovery. The unemployment rate among blacks is still
twice that of whites. The teenage unemployment rate
among blacks and Hispanics is more than triple that of
whites. Poverty is widespread in the black and Latino
communities. In city-controlled jobs, despite the exis-
tence of a Boston Residency Jobs Ordinance, blacks and
Hispanics continue to be concentrated in the lower-pay-
ing entry level jobs. There is a white monopoly on higher-
paying executive, managerial, and officer positions in the
city and state-controlled jobs as well as in the private sec-
tor. The Executive Ordinance issued in July 1985 which
extends the requirements of the Boston Residency Jobs
Ordinance to the private sector has not been enforced. No
plan for its implementation has been publicized. No affir-
mative action policy has been either implemented or pub-
licized. And, as the Boston Redevelopment Authority
stated in a report issued last year, "in Boston, there is pov-
erty amidst affluence." Much, much more has to be done
to translate rhetoric and "good will" into concrete action
that will alleviate the untoward economic conditions of
the outsider groups in Boston.
Evidence to Support These Conclusions?
Reports from the Boston Redevelopment Authority
show that since 1976 Boston has experienced a major con-
struction boom. Reports from the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts show that the State has been privileged
with unparalleled economic growth. As a result of this
economic expansion, the State could boast in February
1986 of a 3.7 percent unemployment rate, tied with New
Hampshire for the lowest unemployment rate in the na-
tion. The Governor of the Commonwealth claims that
this recovery is so magnificent and pervasive that it may
be necessary for Massachusetts to import workers in or-
der to meet job needs within the State.
Ganz and Perkins, 2 writing for the Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority and, by definition, the City of Boston,
stated that the "structural transformation" of the city's
economy has meant a movement away from large scale
manufacturing and wholesale trade to service activities,
particularly in communications, business and profes-
sional services, higher education and other related areas.
They reported in 1985 that Boston experienced a net gain
of 77,000 jobs between 1976 and 1984. These jobs were
distributed principally as follows: 14,000 in business and
professional services; 17,000 in higher education and
medicine; 15,000 in finances; 7,000 in communications;
7,500 in retail trade, and 2,500 in the hotel industry. Many
areas of net gain are precisely the areas in which the par-
ticipation rate of blacks and other minorities is much
lower than warranted.
Further, some 18,000 new jobs were created in Boston
in 1984 and another 10,000 were created in 1985. It is pro-
jected that between 1985 and 1995, some 100,000 newjobs
will be created in the city of Boston alone. A significant
proportion of jobs generated since 1976, as well as those
projected for the future, are in the downtown area in
which blacks and other residents of Boston, white and
non-black minorities, have less than a fair chance of em-
ployment. A considerable proportion of the 100,000 new
jobs will be generated by "a projected $6.2 billion in new
construction."3 Of that sum, $2.7 billion will be realized
from development projects now underway and which are
scheduled for completion between 1985 and 1988. These
projections include a gain of 56,000 office jobs; 15,500
manufacturing jobs; 5,400 hotel jobs, and 9,000 retail
trade jobs. The ten "downtown development projects"
alone will result in 13,843 construction jobs and 24,735
permanent jobs. However, these are private development
enterprises. The employment record of these firms with
respect to blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Boston residents
is atrocious.
According to data collected during my interviews, there
is not now— and never has been — a single black construc-
tion firm involved in any aspect of the downtown con-
struction projects. Blacks were not involved anywhere in
the re-development of Fanueil Hall and Quincy Market.
Labor unions continue to be anti-black, and often anti-
city residents, with respect to permitting access to their
apprenticeship training programs and, of course, in their
hiring practices. As a result of these situations, it is esti-
mated by city officials that only 35 percent of jobs in Bos-
ton are held by Boston residents. It is also estimated that
between 75 and 80 percent of all downtown jobs with sal-
aries in excess of $15,000 per year are held by non-Boston
residents. Is there any wonder, then, that Boston has one
of the highest poverty rates of any city in the nation?
Further evidence of the assertion that blacks have not
shared fully in the economic boom in Boston and of the
persistence of discrimination and racial exclusion in the
market place comes from such areas as investigative re-
porters (e.g. the Pulitzer Prize winning group from the
Boston Globe), data generated from the Regional Office
of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, and an examination of data generated by the City of
Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. These
data often demonstrate trends, changes, or stability over a
specific time period, from 1972 to 1985. These data con-
sistently reveal pervasive underutilization of blacks, and
the effects of prejudice and white preference in the mar-
ketplace. This is true, whether we focus on city and state-
controlled jobs or in the private sector. The results are
uniform when we examine the full range of occupational
positions: from the chief executive officers, the executive
officers, managers, administrators, sales clerks, profes-
sionals, technicians, clerical workers, to crafts workers,
and in some areas, the service workers. There is clearly a
whitepreference, not an equality ofopportunityforjobs in
Boston. This finding holds in every type of institution,
business enterprise, and organization in the city. It is true
for the newspapers, banking institutions, colleges and
universities, insurance companies, printing companies,
high technology firms, communications, general mer-
chandise stores, food stores, hotels, and restaurants. The
statistical data presented in my report 1 reveal the perva-
siveness of minority underrepresentation and white pref-
erence in all of these areas.
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Employment in Municipal Government
There is no reason to deny the fact that under the Flynn
Administration improvements have been made toward
addressing some of the critical issues of unemployment,
income inequities, lack of access to city-controlled jobs,
and poverty. The same must be said, and has been re-
ported, with respect to the second Dukakis Administra-
tion. At the same time, it is equally imperative to recog-
nize the immense disparity between rhetoric and concrete
action. It is concrete action, not rhetoric, which results in
meaningful social change and economic empowerment
for the outsider groups. I wish to focus specific attention
now on two areas of employment with city government:
(1) total work force and (2) new hires. Then, some atten-
tion will be given to the race variable in the distribution of
state-controlled jobs.
The data reported in my chapter in The Emerging Black
Community in Boston represented May 1985 findings on
total city employment by income and race. 1 It showed that
the underutilization of blacks is widespread throughout
city government. It also showed that the severity of the
problem varies by department. Nevertheless, it was quite
evident that the white monopoly of certain jobs was more
manifest in twelve departments or divisions, including the
Retirement Board, Administrative Service, Inspectional
Services, City Clerk's Office, Treasury Department, Elec-
tion Department, Finance Commission, Law Depart-
ment, Real Property Department, Environmental De-
partment, the Court House Commission and the Registry
of Deeds. The city's own data also showed that one-third
of all persons earning between $6,000 and $9,999 were
black; approximately one-fourth of those earning be-
tween $10,000 and $12,000 were black. However, 96 per-
cent of all persons with incomes in excess of $33,000 per
year were white, and the data showed that at all levels be-
tween $13,000 and $29,000 in annual incomes, more than
80 percent were white. These data did not include the
3,000 employees in Health and Hospitals. When they are
included, the evidence shows that in 1985 about 40 per-
cent of all Health and Hospital employees were black
and/or Hispanic. However, these two groups comprise 93
percent of all the workers in the two lowest pay categories,
while whites comprise 90 percent of all persons holding
upper echelon jobs.
Recently, I made a comparison of income distributions
by race among the total work force of the city government
for the fourth quarter of 1984 and the fourth quarter of
1985. This analysis does, indeed, confirm increasing ac-
cess to city-controlled jobs by blacks and minorities.
Much more should be said about these reports. By the end
of the fourth quarter in 1984, minorities represented 17.87
percent of the total work force. This percentage rose to
19.46 percent at the end of 1985. During the same period,
the percent black in the total work force rose from 14.35
to 15.2 percent, or slightly less than one full percent in the
aggregate. Further, this analysis reveals that the higher the
income level, the greater is the white monopoly, and
greater is the underrepresentation of blacks, Hispanics
and Asians.
In 1985, blacks comprised 12.1 percent of persons earn-
ing under $6,000 per year; 36.8 percent of those earning
between $6,000 and $9,999 (below poverty level wages);
24.1 percent of those earning between $10,000 and 12,999
(at the poverty level); about 15 percent of those earning
between $16,000 and 29,999; but only about 3 percent of
those with earnings in excess of $30,000. As in 1984,
whites in 1985 held about 96 percent of all the managerial
and executive level jobs in city government.
I also made a similar analysis of "new hires" in city gov-
ernment, utilizing city-generated data. The period of
comparison is the fourth quarter of 1984 with the fourth
quarter of 1985. (See Table 1.)
Table 1
Percent Minority By Income for
City Government Work Force: 1984 and 1985
Percent Minority
(Minority/ Direction
Income 1984 Blacks) 1985 of Change
Less than 6,000 64.44 (-/-) 59.18 -
6,000- 9,999 42.86 (-/-) 37.50 -
10,000-12,999 26.32 (-/-) 28.89 +
13,000-15,999 12.00 (3/3) 15.63 +
16,000-19,999 50.00 (9/9) 13.04 -
20,000-24,999 46.03 (25/25) 41.67 -
25,000-29,999 40.00 (2/2) 14.29 -
30,000-32,999 0.00 (-/-) 0.00 -
33,000-over 20.00 (1/1) 0.00 -
Note: In 1985 (4th Qtr),
of that 88, or 78.3
per year, and 64
$13,000 per year
88 minorities (incl. 61 blacks) were hired. However, 69
percent, were hired in jobs which paid less than $16,000
or 72 percent, were hired in jobs that paid less than
which is about the poverty level in Boston.
Unmistakably, the city is hiring more blacks. The prob-
lem is that they are hired in entry-level positions which
result in low wages. In turn, they are confronted with
enormous problems of inadequate housing, maintaining
an acceptable living standard, and difficulties in support-
ing a family.
Employment in State-Controlled Jobs
The Massachusetts State Office of Affirmative Action
reported in 1984 that blacks held 8.36 percent of the state-
wide work force of 92,310 persons. The percent minority
in the state's work force rose from 7 to 11 percent between
1980 and 1984. In 1984, blacks and other minorities were
unevenly distributed with respect to job categories as well
as among the fifteen Secretariats of State Government.
Black males represented 3.4 percent of the officials and
administrators, 1.3 percent of the professionals, 2.7 per-
cent of the technicians, 3.5 percent of the skilled craft
positions and 9.5 percent of all lower-paying positions.
Black females constituted 3.0 percent of the officials and
administrators, 2.8 percent of the professionals, 5.8 per-
cent of the technicians, 9 percent of persons holding cleri-
cal positions, and 0.4 percent of the skilled crafts posi-
tions. Black women also comprised 3.4 percent of the
12,725 workers classified in lower-paying positions.
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Not only is there an underutilization of blacks by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but there is a signifi-
cant shortage of black males in such positions. Within the
fifteen Secretariats of State Government, blacks com-
prise 3.4 and 3.0 percent for males and females, respec-
tively. Among this group, blacks are more likely to be
employed in Higher Education, Human Services and in
the Economic and Manpower Secretariat than among
other secretariats. However, in higher education, blacks
hold only 2.8 percent of the faculty positions; and there
are several state colleges without a single black faculty
member, including Framingham State College, Green-
field Community College, Massachusetts Maritime Aca-
demy, Middlesex College and Quinsigamond Commu-
nity College. The highest percentage of black and minor-
ity faculty among all state-supported institutions is found
at the University of Massachusetts at Boston which re-
ported a 6.8 percent representation. Private institutions
do not fare as well as public institutions in the recruit-
ment, hiring and promotion of black and other minority
faculty members.
Most colleges and universities in Massachusetts have a
shameful record with respect to the recruitment and hir-
ing of blacks and other minorities. Some departments
within these institutions have never employed a single
black person.
Consequences of the Employment Profile
The consequences of the employment profile described
to this point are reflected in the extensive poverty rate of
Boston. It is estimated by the Boston Redevelopment Au-
thority that within five years, approximately 25 percent of
all Bostonians will be in poverty. The national rate now is
only about 15 percent. The BRA also reports that in 1985,
some 44 percent of Boston's population is low income —
that is, "earning no more than twice the poverty level" (of
$10,609 for a family of four). A significant proportion of
the low-income population in Boston is found in the
black and Hispanic populations. When one compares
employment, income, and unemployment across neigh-
borhood lines, immediately observable is the fact of high
concentrations of the unemployed, under-employed, and
low-income in those neighborhoods populated by minor-
ity groups. So, when the Governor speaks of the need to
import workers, we may wish to ask him to take a ride on
the Orange Line, the Red Line, and walk through the
neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester, South Boston
and East Boston and talk to people out of work but who
would relish employment by the city, state or private
sector.
What Can Be Done?
We are cognizant of a number of initiatives already
implemented for the alleviation of some of these prob-
lems. The Governor's Executive Search Program, and his
Executive Orders 235, 236, and 246 as well as rigorous
monitoring of discriminatory practices by the Massachu-
setts Commission Against Discrimination are important
beginnings. But much more must be done. At the munici-
pal level, the promulgation of the Boston Residency Jobs
Ordinance in 1983, its extension by an Executive Order in
July 1985, and the establishment of a Municipal Office of
Affirmative Action are equally positive signs.
We may also applaud efforts to address teenage unem-
ployment through programs such as Boston Works, the
Boston Compact, the Private Industry Council, and the
special efforts of organizations such as the Urban
League, Action for Boston Community, the Job Corps,
and Jobs for Youth.
However, major problems persist. It is their existence in
1986 which underlie the disparity between good intention
rhetoric and actual implementation of strategies to elimi-
nate economic inequities between the races. To be spe-
cific: while it is true that the public sector has a better
track record for overall employment than does the private
sector, the fact remains that blacks and other minorities
are more likely to be hired in lower level jobs or on the sec-
ondary tier of a split labor market. The Boston Residency
Jobs Ordinance has, indeed, brought many jobs to the
target groups. However, a look at Copley Place is instruc-
tive, for it reaffirms the position of unequal distribution
of blacks and other minorities throughout the work force.
Further, neither the Ordinance nor its Executive exten-
sion to the private sector has been rigorously enforced.
According to reports obtained for this presentation, there
are still no enforcement mechanisms in place; there are no
sanctions and no penalties in place for those persons who
do not meet hiring policies. There is no money allocated
for enforcement and compliance. There are no blacks do-
ing business in Fanueil Hall and Quincy Market. McDon-
alds in Lafayette Place is the only franchise operated by a
black person in downtown Boston. There does not appear
to be a firm monitoring policy for the enforcement of the
residency requirements. Blacks still do not have access to
union-controlled jobs because of the historic patterns of
exclusion found among unions.
Why Sanctions Are Needed
1
.
Sanctions are costs. A cost for discrimination pre-
vents some people from actualizing prejudiced atti-
tudes into overt discriminatory behavior. If sanc-
tions are high or detrimental to the economic or
social well-being of the discriminator, discrimina-
tion may be lessened.
2. If discriminators sense that anti-discriminatory
policies are not likely to be enforced, there is no per-
ceived cost for discrimination. Discrimination is
likely to continue.
3. Effectiveness of public policy designed to correct
social and economic inequality requires leverage
used in creative ways.
The City still has not effectively used its leverage to per-
suade compliance to affirmative action in procurement
or purchasing; nor has it used its leverage with respect to
zoning restrictions and demanding escrows for develop-
ers that do not have a record of compliance.
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It seems to me that a coherent policy strategy combines
the kinds of projections for job creation with an effective
training and recruitment program to be simultaneously
implemented. Training programs begin in family atti-
tudes toward schooling and preparation for work, and re-
socialization of young people for the requirements of the
world of work— language, attitudes, presentation of self,
inter-personal relationships, punctuality, and so on. It de-
mands quality schooling and an interesting and stimulat-
ing learning environment so as to stem the horrendous
drop-out rate among blacks and Hispanics. It means
communication and liaison between colleges and school
systems to create an awareness of market needs so that
young people will prepare themselves for the kinds of
positions that are available and will be created in the near
future. It requires a re-examination of admissions policies
and practices and a new assessment of institutional envi-
ronments to make learning itself more attractive and
meaningful. Clearly, commitment to the goal of eco-
nomic equity and the elimination of inequities will re-
quire all of this and more. It can be done. It must be done.
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Some Observations
on
Closing The Gap
by
Jeremiah P. Cotton
James P. Smith and Finis R. Welch, along with fellow
economist Richard B. Freeman, have been primarily re-
sponsible for the much accepted notion that there have
been "dramatic" advances in the economic situation of
blacks in the recent past. Closing The Gap: 40 Years of
Economic Progressfor Blacks (CTG) 1 is just the latest in-
stallment and reworking of this optimism. Freeman at-
tributed the alleged progress to a "collapse" of labor mar-
ket discrimination caused by "governmental and related
antidiscrimination activity associated with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act."2 Smith and Welch (hereinafter S&W), on the
other hand, have always been somewhat agnostic about
the efficacy of affirmative action. Instead, they have con-
sistently sought to show that the longrun progress they
claim for blacks has been due to two major factors: the
improvement in the quantity and quality of black educa-
tion and the great North to South, rural to urban, migra-
tion undertaken by blacks during the 1940's, 50's and 60's.
They concede that there have been other developments
during subperiods of the 1940-80 period that may have
had some short term effects on black progress and exam-
ine three of them. The first is the revolution of Southern
agriculture following the introduction of the mechanical
cotton picker and other technologies. The second is the
decline in black male labor force participation, and the
third, of course, is affirmative action.
Although Freeman and S&W were not entirely agreed
on the causes of black progress, they were as one on the
fact of it. In CTG, S&W present evidence indicating that
the black male average weekly wage as a percent of the
white male wage increased significantly between 1940 and
1980. "(In 1940) the typical black male worker earned
only 43 percent as much as his white counterpart. By
1980, the average black man in the labor force earned 73
percent as much as the typical white man." This increase
in weekly wages was spread across all work experience
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